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The Religious World view 
of Nishida Kitard
Yusa Michiko
THE Japanese PHILOSOPHER Nishida Kitard (1870-1945) regarded 
religion as “the ultimate view of the world and the most important 
question,”* dealing as it does with “the source of life and death.”2 
Nishida’s interest in the subject grew, he notes (IV: 3-4), during his 
work on the book Art and Morality3 in the years 1922-1925. He began 
at that time to consider an epistemology of the religious worldview, 
outlining his ideas on the matter in his 1923 essay “What is Given Im­
mediately” (IV: 9-37). In 1928 he took up the topic of religious con­
sciousness with his work “The Intelligible World.”4 His first attempt to 
establish a philosophy of religion was his essay, “Toward a Philosophy 
of Religion, with the Concept of Pre-established Harmony as Guide,”5 
written in 1944.
* This article is an introduction to the author’s translation of Nishida KitarO’s “The 
Logic of Topes and the Religious Worldview” (Bashoteki ronri to shQkybteki 
sekaikan}, published in the Eastern Buddhist Vol. XIX, No. 2 (Autumn 1986), pp. 1- 
29, and Vol. XX, No. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 81-119; for the original see Nishida KitarO 
Zensha (The Collected Works of Nishida Kitard), vol. XI (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1979 edi­
tion), pp. 371-464; hereafter all references to Nishida’s collected works will be by 
Roman numerals designating the volume number, and Arabic numerals designating 
the page numbers.
' Cf. Nishida’s letter to Omodaka Hisayuki, March 23, 1945; XIX: 408.
2 Cf. Nishida’s letter to Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, April 12, 1945; XIX: 417.
3 Art and Morality, tr. David Dilworth and V. H. Viglielmo (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1973), a translation of III: 237-545.
4 For ‘‘The Intelligible World” (V: 123-185) see Robert Shinzinger, tr., Intelligibili­
ty and the Philosophy of Nothingness (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1958).
5 XI: 114-146; David Dilworth, tr.. Eastern Buddhist III, 1 (May 1970), pp. 19-46.
This was followed a year later by the final work of Nishida’s life, 
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“The Logic of Topos (Basho) and the Religious Worldview,”6 in 
which he summarized his philosophical vision and further developed 
his thought upon the matter of religion. Completed two months before 
his death, this essay is ranked by many on a par with his first work, A 
Study of Good (1911), one of the earliest and most influential works of 
modern Japanese philosophy. “The Logic of Topos and the Religious 
Worldview” is imbued with a certain urgency and intensity, due 
perhaps to some premonition the author may have had of his own im­
minent death, or to the circumstances under which the essay was com­
posed.7
6 Bashoteki ronri to shilkyOteki sekaikan (1945). For a relatively simple exposition 
of Nishida’s philosophical vision of the world see “The Logical Structure of the Actual 
World’’ (XIV: 421-509), the transcript of a scries of five lectures given in November 
and December 1933; its style retains the vividness of the oral presentation.
' We learn from Nishida’s diary that he began the composition of this essay on 
February 4th and finished it on April 14th, 1945. At that time the Second World War 
was entering into its final stage, and major Japanese cities were being heavily bombed. 
Despite his friends’ wish that he move to the countryside for safety, Nishida stayed on 
at Kamakura near Tokyo and concentrated on writing while the attacks continued. 
This precarious situation reminded him of “Hegel, who wrote The Phenomenology of 
Mind in Jena under the threat of Napoleon’s cannonballs,” he wrote to Hisamatsu 
Shin’ichi on April 12, 1945 (XIX: 417). He felt his life under imminent threat not only 
because of the war, he seems also to have had a premonition of his approaching death. 
In retrospect it is symbolic that he took up this essay in the middle of another work, 
“Life” (Seimei) (XI: 289-370), on which he worked from September to December 
1944, and which he never finished. He took sick and died suddenly at Kamakura on 
June 7, 1945.
In contrast to thinkers like Schleiermacher, whose humanistic 
philosophy of religion interprets God as accessible through the 
medium of human feeling, Nishida argues that God can be faced only 
in the utter denial of all things human (XIV: 508). Maintaining that ex­
istence precedes philosophical reflection, he advances a “logic of 
'topos'" incorporating the reality of the self and the world, as the 
only logical path capable of doing justice to religious reality (XI: 415- 
416, 459).
Logic. One of Nishida’s lifelong concerns was the logical expression 
of the Oriental experience, as he indicated in the preface to his collec­
tion of essays, From That which Acts to That which Sees (1927):
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It is certainly true that we have much to admire and learn 
from the glorious development of Western culture which 
takes form as being and becoming as good; but at the bottom 
of Oriental culture which has nourished our ancestors for 
thousands of years, is there not hidden something like “see­
ing the form of the formless, hearing the voice of the 
voiceless”? Our heart never ceases to yearn for it. I would like 
to give a philosophical foundation to such longing. (IV: 6)
In his attempt to do this, he looked first to the relationship between 
the subject and predicate of a judgement (cf. IV: 189), drawing upon 
Aristotle’s definition of substance (hypokeimenon) as “the substratum. . . 
of which something is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of 
anything else” (Metaphysics, VII, 2; IV: 95). Starting with “The In­
telligible World,” Nishida adopted from phenomenology the terms 
‘noesis’ and ‘noema’ to express, respectively, the subjective and objec­
tive aspects of consciousness. After his 1934 work Fundamental Prob­
lems of Philosophy, however, he discarded them in favor of the terms 
‘subject-oriented logic*  (shugoteki ronri), ‘predicate-oriented logic*  
(jutsugoteki ronri), and ‘objective logic*  (taishoteki ronri).1
1 Even though what Nishida calls subject-oriented logic emphasizes the aspect of 
noema and predicate-oriented logic that of noesis, it seems the presupposition that 
noema and noesis stand in the relationship of opposition eventually led Nishida to 
discard this terminology. Nishida saw noesis as always embracing the noema. With the 
terminology of subject- and predicate-oriented logic he hoped to avoid this difficulty. 
In advocating his dialectical position Nishida maintained that the contradictory self­
identity of subject and object is the condition of possibility of any phenomenological 
discussion (cf. XIV: 445-446; VIII: 4).
Subject-oriented logic puts the individual, that which exists, in the 
position of the subject of a judgement (i.e., S is P, as in “the rose is 
red”), and considers S, the individual, as unique and irreducible. This 
Aristotelian definition of the individual regards the subject of the judge­
ment objectively. Thus, according to Nishida’s terminology, subject- 
oriented logic is synonymous with objective logic in terms of approach.
Predicate-oriented logic, on the other hand, considers any judge­
ment to pertain to the activity of consciousness itself. “S is P” implies 
that “S is in P,” for P belongs to the field of self-consciousness and 
judgement is the activity of self-consciousness (XIII: 366). Plato’s view
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of being as that which participates in an idea inclines toward predicate- 
oriented logic (IX: 383), for it views the individual as partaking in 
something of the universal.
In sum, subject-oriented logic emphasizes the objective uniqueness 
of the individual, while predicate-oriented logic emphasizes the in­
dividual's universality and subjective awareness.
Nishida’s own position is that that which exists in the truest sense is 
the self-conscious human individual, and that this reality can be 
grasped by neither subject-oriented nor predicate-oriented logic. It can 
be understood only through the logic of topos (jbashoteki ronri) (XI: 
401-402, 413; XIV: 487). The logic of topos involves the contradictory 
self-identity of subject and predicate (cf. XI: 416), as the human in­
dividual is both the self-objectifying predicate and the self-predicating 
subject of a judgement? Human beings cannot be defined as merely 
capricious and instinctive (as in subject-oriented logic), nor as simply 
rational (as in predicate-oriented logic). The logic of topos defines the 
mode of human existence as volitional, self-contradictory, and fun­
damentally non-rational (XI: 400-402; 434). This both combines and 
transcends Aristotelian subject-oriented logic, Kantian objective logic, 
and Hegelian dialectic (IX: 5; cf. XIV: 437). Hegel's dialectic syn­
thesizes subject and object, but in emphasizing the rational Absolute 
Spirit, Nishida observes, it continues to assume the primacy of the 
universal over the individual. The latter is left as an abstraction, unfree 
in the face of the absolute principle (XIV: 438, 501; XI: 399), whereas 
Nishida claims that his dialectic “renders the individual ever more in­
dividual” (XI: 132). The logic of topos, dealing with the volitional, 
self-contradictory and non-rational nature of human existence, is the 
logical form Nishida believes most capable of illuminating the reality 
of religion.
Self-Consciousness and Topos. Nishida’s philosophy underwent a 
gradual process of development as he grappled with the nature and 
modality of self-consciousness (Jikaku). His thinking in the early phase
9 Nishida refers to an observation made by Bosanquet that “the subject of the judge­
ment of perception is not a logical subject but that which exists” (IV: 94), and one by 
Hegel that “judgment is established based on the fact that subject is predicate, in­
dividual is universal” (VIII: 371).
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might be described in Hegelian and Husserlian terms as a 
phenomenology of self-consciousness, though Nishida himself claims 
that his thought “stands at the opposite pole from Hegel’s dialectic 
stance—it is Buddhistic” (XI: 73). He sees himself as heir to the Bud­
dhist tradition for which the mind is the fundamental principle (XI: 86; 
XIV: 460).
Nishida describes the modality of self-consciousness as “I see myself 
in myself.” This is also the modality of knowing: “I mirror myself in 
myself” (IV: 215). I know something when my self-consciousness 
reflects on itself and “in myself.” Consciousness, in other words, 
reflects on itself, in the self. Nishida claims that the activity of con­
sciousness is fundamentally that of self-consciousness (XI: 383), which 
arises by “one’s transcending oneself and facing the other” (XI: 378). 
It arises only in relation to the other without any ground of its own (see 
p. 71, below, and note 13).
It was with the idea of topos10 11in his essay of 1926 (IV: 208-289) that 
Nishida began the systematization of his philosophical worldview. The 
concept of topos occurred to him, he notes, through his criticism of 
Aristotle’s subject-oriented logic (IX: 4). The idea of topos may be 
viewed also as a crystallization of his belief in the priority of experience 
over individuation, as expressed in the preface to A Study of Good: It 
is not that there is experience because the individual exists; rather, on 
account of experience the individual exists” (I: 4). The word topos 
(basho) came from Plato’s discussion of the “receptacle of ideas” 
(Timaeus 50c), Nishida notes, though he cautions that these two con­
cepts are different. Topos, he says in a response to Sdda KiichirO," is 
“the plane of consciousness which is predicate and not subject” (IV: 
315-316). P always embraces S, as S (the object of judgement) is within 
P (the field of consciousness).
10 The word basho has been variously rendered as “place,” “field,” “ropos,” 
“locus,” or simply transliterated as “AosAo.” Nishida himself uses the German Platz, 
‘place’, and Feld, ‘field’, for basho in his fragmentary notes (XIII: 281, 284, 285, 295, 
314 ff.).
11 It was Soda who critiqued Nishida’s essay "Topos" and also gave his thinking the 
name Nishida Tetsugaku, ’Nishida philosophy’, in recognition of its unique achieve­
ment (cf. editor’s note in IV: 433-434).
Topos is both the locus in which self-consciousness arises and the
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locus which emerges simultaneously with, and only in relation to, self­
consciousness. This double, interdependent dynamism—the 
simultaneous arising and mutual determination of self-consciousness 
and topos—is the core feature of this term. The idea of topos 
designates the horizon of consciousness, although it is ontologically 
prior to it in that this horizon arises within topos.
Nishida identifies topos with the concrete world of our everyday ex­
istence, the world in which we are born, live, and die. It is through the 
determination of self-consciousness that the self and the world come 
into being, since “the activity of our consciousness is nothing but the 
process of our individual self-determination” (XI: 386). Not only do 
self and consciousness form a coordinate point as two aspects of one 
and the same reality, but the fact that something occurs, or ‘takes 
place/ in the world implies our becoming aware of this something. 
(The English expression ‘takes place’ bears a happy resemblance to 
Nishida’s vision of topos, the ‘place’.) As self-consciousness and the 
world give rise to each other, the self and the world co-arise.12
12 The Buddhist idea of dependent co-origination (pratTtya-samutpada, J. engi) may 
be recalled in this connection.
In “The Intelligible World” Nishida suggests that three kinds of 
world—the natural, the conscious (including the world of intellectual 
awareness), and the intelligible—are distinguishable in terms of the 
three aspects of self-consciousness: the object of consciousness, the sub­
ject of self-consciousness, and the ground of self-consciousness. To 
these Nishida adds a fourth: the world of pure awareness, in which 
there is neither seer nor seen (V: 451; cf. V: 177). This is the world 
grasped by, among others, those who have experienced the satori of the 
Zen tradition, the direct awareness of the groundless ground of self­
consciousness.
Topos is the formless seat of being, the where of being. Mediated by 
topos, the self and the world stand in “absolutely contradictory self­
identity” (zettai mujunteki jiko doitsu): the one (the world) and the 
many (individual people) stand in interrelation and interpenetration. 
In temporal terms, the world is one; in spatial terms, the world is 
many, for each individual is a world in himself, and there are as many 
worlds as there are individuals. The world is both one and many. 
Moreover, not only is “the one ... the self-negation of the many and
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the many ... the self-negation of the one” (XIV: 469), but “the one, 
through its self-negation, is the many, and the many, through their 
self-negation, are one” (XIV: 483). The world (the one) and individual 
people (the many) interpenetrate, while each person bears the moments 
of singularity and plurality simultaneously. (For this point see pp. 69- 
70, below.)
The Dialectical Vision of the World and the Self This world of ab­
solutely contradictory self-identity is “historical,” not in the sense that 
it is based on past events but in the sense that it is history-making, as 
the world is formed and developed by the actions of each individual 
(XIV: 435-436). The historical world is the world of human beings as 
persons (jinkaku), interrelating and interreacting (XIV: 247). A person 
is born into this world as that which is created, yet becomes that which 
creates. The created being, in other words, gives rise to a creating be­
ing: the created creates. “Person is create et creans” (XI: 130, 144). 
For Nishida, the idea of person is intrinsically one with the idea of 
creativity and creation.
In this fashion, the person shapes the world as its constitutive, 
creative element. Creativity is the mobilizing factor of the historical 
world which moves “from that which is created to that which creates 
(tsukurareta mono kara tsukuru mono e).” In this dynamic process, 
however, the world maintains its self-identity, and therein Nishida sees 
an aspect of the relationship between God and the world (XIV: 506- 
507), or of the trinitarian relationship of the Father, Son, and the Holy 
Spirit (XI: 403). The Father is the World; the Son, the person; and the 
Holy Spirit, creativity.
Nishida’s vision of the one and the many can be explained in terms 
of a fourfold relationship among the self and the world, and the one 
and the many (see chart below). Under aspect (a), “the self and the 
one,” the self is a self-conscious, singular “I,” distinct, unique, and ir­
replaceable. Under aspect (b), “the self and the many,” this I exists in 
relation to other I’s, opposing and yet interrelating. When we shift 
focus and consider aspect (c), “the world and the one,” each of the 
self-conscious selves is a microcosm that mirrors the entire world. 
Under aspect (d), “the world and the many,” numerous individual 
worlds act as focal points to constitute the world as a whole.
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The Self as a Self-World Continuum
Though these four aspects can be conceptualized in this way, they are 
in reality one. The self, for example, is simultaneously all aspects of 
this fourfold mode of existence at any given moment. It is a perspective 
of the world, and yet it gives shape to the world through its activities. 
Nishida often compares this vision of the world and the self to the “in­
finite sphere” (sphaera infinita) whose circumference is nowhere and 
whose center is everywhere—a metaphor of God mentioned by 
Nicholas of Cusa, Pascal, and others, but whose origin may data back 
to the Gnostics. Each individual self, a microcosm (XI: 385), is one of 
the infinite number of centers of this infinite sphere (XI: 430), and God 
is the center, giving order to the entirety (XI: 379, 406, 423).
The Absolute Present. Self-consciousness partakes of the very 
nature and modality of the present. Nishida points out the radically 
“present” nature of consciousness: the arising of self-consciousness 
always occurs in the present, or rather, when self-consciousness arises, 
that moment is always the present (XIV: 232). In this way, “The pres­
ent is the center of the self. I exist at the present; the present is where I 
exist” (XIV: 353). The present is the locus of topos, of self-awareness.
The present is the point at which the temporal and spatial axes in­
tercept, for the present moment encompasses both time (things have a 
past history and are open to the future) and space (things co-exist in the 
spatial dimension). The present moment thus embraces time and space, 
consciousness and matter, subjectivity and objectivity (cf. XIV: 232- 
249): it is truly dialectical. Nishida is in basic agreement with the ac-
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count of time given by Augustine in the eleventh chapter of The Confes­
sions, to the effect that the past (memory) and the future (expectation) 
are immanent in the present. In his earlier works Nishida calls this pre­
sent, containing the infinite past and future, the “eternal now” or the 
“ever present eternity” (nunc aeternum, J. eien no ima; cf. VI: 181- 
232). Later he uses the term “absolute present” (zettai genzai; cf. IX 
196-197 etpassim). That each moment is the determination of the eter­
nal now renders each moment eternal.
The absolute present, being absolutely nothing with no ground of its 
own, sustains the world through its self-determination (XI: 376, 379). 
Constantly determining itself into the present moment, it gives birth to 
the historical world. The world, without any substratum of its own,13 
moves from that which is created to that which creates as the self-deter­
mination of the absolute present, of topos. Something religious lies at 
the ground of this historical world, Nishida believes, for otherwise 
history would be reduced to nature (X: 502). This claim forms the basis 
of his philosophy of religion (cf. XI: 141). The world derives its fun­
damental religiousness from its absolutely present nature (XIV: 506- 
507). “God is the absolute present” (XI: 116), and each of us, as the 
self-determination of this absolute present, is a unique individual (XI: 
144).
13 J. mukiteiteki. This word has a Mahayana counterpart, apratisthdna (see, for ex­
ample, Vimalaklrti Sutra 6.6). In the Diamond SOtra (10c, 14e), this idea appears in the 
Chinese translation as wusuozhu (J. mushojQ) or wuzhu (rrmjQ), ‘having no dwelling 
place’, which Nishida is fond of quoting (e.g., XI: 423, 430, 431). He also empathizes 
with the idea of “groundlessness” spoken of by the German mystic Jacob Bdhme, who 
described the will as Ungrund (V: 182-183). Groundlessness is the other side of the im­
mediacy of experience, and the standpoint of freedom (XI: 450).
Nishida, defining religion as the human demand for eternal life, 
believes that religious salvation hinges on the realization of this de­
mand (cf. XI: 453-454). Eternal life, which is none other than “the de­
mand of real self-consciousness” (XI: 133), is not attained after death 
but exists in that very mode of life for which “the now is the absolute 
present” (XI: 402). This eternal present resonates with the Buddhist in­
tuition that samsOra (life and death) is nirvana (liberation from the cy­
cle of life and death) (XI: 421-422). In the realization and fulfillment
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of the eternal now the self is free, transcending the causation of the 
spatio-temporal world (XI: 425).
Nishida’s radically presentist vision of the world of the one and 
many may bring to mind William Blake’s poetic intuition:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand, 
And Eternity in an hour.
(Auguries of Innocence)
The Logic of Religion: The God-Person Relationship. Nishida 
defines God as the absolute present, as the historical world, as the 
topos of Absolute Nothing (i.e., groundlessness, substratumlessness), 
as Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity, or as Absolute Being. 
Developing his dialectical view of God, Nishida writes that true Ab­
solute Being is simultaneously absolutely nothing and absolutely being 
(XI: 398). Again, Absolute Being does not simply transcend relative be­
ings, but, through its self-negation, it meets and thoroughly embraces 
them (XI: 420, 435). God’s self-negation is his raison d’etre—through 
it he has his existence “in the many, in the numerous real individuals” 
(XI: 398). It is through self-negation that God is completely present in 
this world. God’s self-negation is precisely the expression of his uncon­
ditional love and compassion; in his love, God continually embraces 
humanity. Nishida, echoing a famous remark by Shinran, writes that 
God is ready to negate and manifest himself even in the form of a devil 
if it is necessary to save the wicked (XI: 404-405). He also finds an ex­
pression of this divine self-negation in the Christian doctrine of the In­
carnation (XI: 435-436).
Self-negation is also the way through which human beings relate to 
God (XI: 396, 411). In self-negation, the self dies to the ego-self and is 
bom to the true self. For the self to transcend itself is for it to return to 
the root of the self, to realize its “real self’ (XI: 423).
This self-negation—of God, of the world, of the individual person— 
is the crux of Nishida’s philosophy of religion. The essential moment 
of negation and paradoxical oneness of Being and Nothingness is ex­
pressed by what D. T. Suzuki calls the logic of sokuhi (cf. XI: 398-399). 
Sokuhi is the equation mediated by negation: “To say that A is A is to
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say that A is non-A, therefore A is A.”14 Suzuki sees the logic of sokuhi 
as the characteristic form of discourse in the Diamond Sutra, with its 
frequent statements like: 4‘To say all dharmas are dharmas is to say 
that all dharmas are not dharmas, therefore they are called dharmas” 
(17d) (cf. XI: 399). This is one way of expressing the Buddhist ex­
perience of “form is emptiness, emptiness as such is form” (rQpam 
tony ata, tony ata eva rftpam).
14 “KongO-kyO no Zen,” Suzuki Daisetz ZenshQ, vol. V (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1968), 
pp. 363-455, esp. pp. 380-383.
God and humanity are always related through their mutual self-nega- 
tion in Nishida’s religious vision, but they are never identical. He notes 
that neither Buddhism nor his religious view are pantheistic (XI: 132, 
428). Pantheism claims that everything shares the nature of God, 
whereas Nishida asserts that God and man, though bound in a mutual 
and interdependent relationship, are separated by eternity. He calls this 
view “panentheistic,” i.e., all is in God (XI: 398-399). He holds that 
the relationship between God and man is characterized by an “inverse 
correlation” (gyakutaiO; cf. XI: 396), fully realized in the person en­
dowed with religio-existential awareness: the more I realize my sin­
fulness, the more God faces me; the more conscious I am of myself as a 
singular existence, the more God stands over against me (XI: 449). One 
detects here not only the influence of Kierkegaard's thought, but also 
of Shinran’s confessional remark, “Amida’s Vow was solely made for 
me, Shinran, alone” (XI: 431, 449). A religious self-understanding— 
be it the Christian view of the fall of man or the Shin Buddhist view of 
human beings as deluded and burning with desire—gives living tension 
to the inversely correlative relationship between God, or Buddha, and 
humanity. Faith, says Nishida, arises within and out of this relation­
ship, called forth ultimately by the grace of God or Buddha. He 
qualifies this, however, by observing that “religious faith” is fun­
damentally different from “subjective belief,” for faith stands on the 
•‘objective fact” of human spirituality (XI: 418).
In the dialectical world, individuals mutually determine themselves 
through expression (XI: 389, 439); “expression,” according to 
Nishida, is the “contradictorily self-identical medium” (XI: 442). He 
attaches great importance to the idea of expression, as it accords with 
his radically relational and substratumless vision of the world. It also
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accounts for the irreducibility of persons endowed with individual self­
consciousness: Nishida notes that “expression is something objective 
and yet also subjective in that it conveys a certain meaning to me” 
(XIV: 490-493), and that “expression can touch, move, and change the 
person in some way” (XIV: 490-493). As such, “expression is power” 
(XI: 440). In the world of religion, too, it is solely by means of expres­
sion—by “the Word of God (Logos) or the Name of Buddha (myOgO)—that 
humanity relates to God (XI: 439-443).
Nishida held that religious reality does not exist outside the world of 
everyday experience or the “ordinary way of looking at things” (byb- 
jotei; cf. XI: 454).15 This ordinary outlook or standpoint, says Nishida, 
is brought about by the self-negation of God, the self-determination of 
the absolute present. This standpoint, which embraces the self in its 
“unity of the mind and the body” (shinjin ichinyo no tachiba; X: 251, 
cf. Dogen), is for the self “Me standpoint of standpoints” (XI: 454), 
“the most fundamental viewpoint, intrinsic to self-existence. It is the 
signpost of our life” (IX: 303). Nishida coins the term byOjOtei from 
byOjOshin, part of the vocabulary of the Chinese Zen masters Baso 
(Mazu) and Nansen (Nanquan). In a famous exchange, Joshu 
(Zhaozhou) asks Nansen, “What is Tao?” Nansen answers, “Or­
dinary mind (pingchenxin, J. byOjOshin), that is Tao” (XI: 454).16 This 
“everyday mindedness” or “ordinary mind” is in Nishida’s language 
nothing other than the self-determination of the absolute present, the 
standpoint of total freedom and self-authenticity (XI: 450). It is here 
that the individual embodies eternal life; it is here that the essential 
Mahayana position of “samsara is nirvana” is realized (XI: 421). The 
ordinary standpoint is in itself the topos, the locus, of religious reality.
15 Ueda Shizuteru observes that whereas Nishida’s idea of inverse correlation 
{gyakutaio) designates the religious relationship between the Absolute and the self, the 
idea of the ordinary standpoint (bybjotei) designates the inverse-correlative mode of 
the existence of the self in this religious relationship (“Gyakutaid to BydjOtei," Risb, 
January 1978, pp. 41-42).
16 Cf. The Transmission of the Lamp, 10; Mumonkan, 19.
A Theology of the Logic of Topos. Knowing that Nishida engaged in 
the intense practice of Zen meditation from his late twenties to his early 
thirties (1897-1903), one might expect that his philosophy of religion
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would be colored by Zen Buddhism. His position can, however, be re­
garded as universally Mahdy&nist. Nishida integrates the insight he 
gained through the practice of Zen with the Shin ethos he absorbed as a 
child and never lost. He sees no essential conflict between the Zen path 
of self-power (jiriki) and the Pure Land path of other-power (tariki). 
Rather, he believes they share “the same ground qua Mahayana Bud­
dhism” (XI: 411). Nishida is not alone in holding this view. Zen master 
Bankei (1622-1693), for instance, advocated the unity of the two paths 
in his recorded sayings, and D. T. Suzuki held that the future of 
Japanese Buddhism lies in the unity of Zen and Shin Buddhism.
Nishida’s correspondence reveals his conviction that “Buddhist 
philosophy has points that excel Christianity and can contribute to the 
future of humanity,”17 and his belief in “the uniqueness and strength 
of Buddhism over against Christianity.”18 Indeed, he held that the Bud­
dhist spiritual attitude of “inner transcendence” (XI: 461) and its 
radically relational cosmology are more in accord than the beliefs of 
Christianity with modern scientific views of the world.
17 Letter to D. T. Suzuki, May II, 1945; XIX: 426-427.
18 Letter to Hisamatsu, April 12, 1945; XIX: 417.
It would, however, be a mistake to regard his philosophical position 
as a Buddhist apologetics. Not only is Nishida critical of conventional 
Buddhism (XI: 462), but his philosophical vision inclines toward a 
universalism. He is intent on uncovering the eternal dimension of 
religion in each religious tradition he discusses. His intellectual and 
temperamental bent towards the universal and essential seems to have 
allowed him to transcend the traditional boundaries of both Buddhism 
and Christianity, pointing the way to an overcoming of the 
parochialism often found in both Eastern and Western spirituality. His 
thinking brings into new focus the matters of wisdom (prajnO) and 
compassion (karuno), faith and grace, Zen intuition and Shin faith, 
and Buddhist and Christian spirituality.
Nishida’s language is markedly theistic, as when he writes, “Without 
God, there is no religion. God is the fundamental concept of religion” 
(XI: 372). His discussions of Mahayana Buddhism embrace a theistic 
moment (doing justice to Shin spirituality). It is intriguing and sug­
gestive that he calls his philosophy of religion “a theology (shingaku) 
of the logic of topos [which is] neither theism nor deism, neither
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spiritualism nor naturalism. It is historical” (XI: 406). Even though he 
uses the word theology only once in his entire writings, he can claim 
(though this is easily misunderstood) to occupy the standpoint of a 
believer, who affirms the reality of spirituality.
It was perhaps inevitable that Nishida would come to hold this posi­
tion, convinced as he was of the unity of the mind and the heart, of 
philosophical pursuit and spiritual inclination. It was his task to ex­
plain spiritual reality from a philosophical standpoint (XI: 371). That 
was not incompatible in his mind, moreover, with the position disclos­
ed in his lecture notes, circa 1911: “One’s religious conviction con­
stitutes a factor in philosophy. A philosopher may not necessarily be a 
believer, but I would imagine he could not be satisfied with a 
philosophical system which goes against his own emotional and 
spiritual temperament” (XV: 177). Again, we read, “Profound 
philosophy necessarily has a religious foundation, and genuine religion 
necessarily demands philosophy” (XV: 174). These convictions are 
quintessentially Nishidan.
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